

SECRET

**Statement for the SSCI by the  
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE**

**24 March 1983**

Mr Chairman:

On 10 March 1983 the budget subcommittee of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence raised questions concerning the advisability of ceasing publication on Soviet military and aid activities. Today I would like to

--Explore the logic behind the Agency's policy of not publishing unclassified analytical reports.

--Review in general terms what has been discontinued and what is still being published in unclassified form by the Agency.

--Explain the types of unclassified reports that we publish under non-Agency seal.

--Specifically discuss the two reports cited in the March 1983 edition of the Armed Forces Journal.

I believe that in order to discuss the Agency's dollar costing work and report on Communist aid activity it's important to understand the backdrop behind the issue of classified versus unclassified publication.

SECRET

SECRET

In October 1981, the CIA decided to stop releasing unclassified analytical reports as Agency publications. This was a decision that was not taken lightly. We were well aware of the costs involved in discontinuing the publication of such reports. The news media had found our publications a source of useful information and, I might point out, at times convenient cannon fodder for debate. We were particularly mindful of the possibility of negative repercussions with the academic community.

Despite these risks, there were a number of compelling arguments which led to this decision.

--A. Impression of Superficiality. In publishing unclassified reports we have found that in the process of sanitizing a paper the methodological base and supporting evidence was often either stripped out or dramatically cut back. This all too often gave the appearance that we were simply asserting findings with little or no evidence to support them. Because of this impression, we inevitably ended up spending more time and analytical resources trying to defend the unclassified report than it took us to prepare and publish the original classified document. The cost in terms of resource diversion should not be underestimated. Questions once received had to be interpreted and responses prepared, coordinated and cleared. Sometimes the questions were clear cut and easy to handle. !

SECRET

SECRET

other cases, because we could not share our data, it was a matter of trying to explain when we had stopped beating our wives. The latter type of questions not only are the hardest to answer but are also the most likely to generate complex and time consuming followup questions.

--B. Politicization of Intelligence. In preparing an unclassified analytical paper, we found the Agency was almost inevitably accused of politicizing its analysis. If the conclusions of a paper seemed to support an administration policy, we were accused of being politically co-opted. People argued that we had twisted our analysis to meet the needs of policymakers. Such accusations only weakened the Agency's credibility. When the Agency issued a report that seemed to undercut an administration position, there were loud cries that the Agency had become an open policy advocate and was attempting to sway public opinion. Regardless of which way the charges went, the fact that the methodological heart and evidence were stripped from the unclassified report only made the Agency look amateurish and unprofessional.

--C. Protection of Sources. In publishing an unclassified report, we also ran the risk of adversely affecting Agency sources. Analysts inevitably wanted to preserve the maximum amount of methodological foundation and factual support. Often wordsmithing was used to work around classification problems. Even when a paper was fully checked, we still ran the risk of

SECRET

3

SECRET

drying up long cultivated sources. The public debate that usually followed release of Agency reports naturally made sources shy away from providing their Agency contacts with further information. Even unclassified analytical reports in unrelated areas made sources wary. If the Agency would publish on one topic, what guarantee would they have that we wouldn't also publish in areas they were reporting on.

When the decision was made by the Agency to stop publishing unclassified reports, this didn't mean that the public flow of information was totally cut off.

--Unclassified reference-type publications, while intended primarily for government use, are still released to the public. Basic unclassified reference material is still made available through the Library of Congress' Document Expediting Project (DOCEX), the Department of Commerce's National Technical Information Service (NTIS), and the Government Printing Office's Federal Depository Library Program. Since October 1981, over 100 such reports have been made available. Most of these provide information on a vast array of economic, energy, and trade data as well as foreign organizational structures and directories of foreign officials. I have brought along copies of three statistical reports and an organizational chart of Chinese Communist Party organizations which have been made available through this channel. I also have brought a

SECRET

**SECRET**

complete listing of what the Agency has published on an unclassified basis by topic, by year from 1972 through 1981, and a listing in chronological order from December 1979 through March of this year.

25X1

**SECRET**

SECRET

--A sizable array of data and detail on the Soviet and Chinese economies has also been published under the auspices of the Congress' Joint Economic Committee. I have brought with me the 1982 JEC compendia in which Agency analysts published reports on such topics as:

--Gross National Product of the USSR, 1950-80

--An Index of Industrial Production in the USSR

--An Index of Agricultural Production in the USSR

--An Index of Consumption in the USSR

--Growth and Structural Change in Chinese Industry: 1952-79

China: An Energy-Constrained Model of Industrial Performance Through 1985

25X1

SECRET

SECRET

25X1

( With this general background, I would like to turn to the issue of the two reports Senators Goldwater and Moynihan mentioned in their 21 March letter. By way of introduction, I should mention that these two reports, which were published annually on an unclassified basis since the mid-1970s, were not released in 1982. Indeed, the paper on Communist aid was not put out in 1981, since it wouldn't have been ready until late in the fourth quarter of that year.

--Communist Aid. The annual report on Soviet and East European aid activity in non-Communist LDCs is no longer published on an unclassified basis by the Agency [REDACTED]

25X1

25X1


[REDACTED] Because of the analytical content of this report--the numbers and trends do require context and explanation--it does fit in with the unclassified reference publications that the Agency does issue [REDACTED]

25X1

SECRET

SECRET

25X1

 While five copies were sent down to the Committee, I have brought along an additional copy in case the Committee members would like to peruse it.

--Soviet and US Defense Activities: A Dollar

Comparison. Unclassified publication of our "dollar cost" paper has also been discontinued. As in the case of other papers we no longer put out, this paper, while heavy on statistics, is also very analytical by its very nature.

25X1

SECRET



SECRET

25X1

The decision not to publish this paper in unclassified form was made in large part because we wanted to avoid being seen as active participants in a complicated and highly emotional political debate. Likewise, the complex nature of this report does not lend itself to understanding by those who do not have access to the sources and methodology which underpin the analysis. Indeed, in prior years, this weakness has caused us untold hours of wasted time in trying to repair the damage caused by the release of the unclassified report.

To summarize briefly, I believe our decision to end the public distribution of unclassified analytical reports was, in retrospect, correct. It has spared us unjustified criticism and has enabled the protection of sensitive sources. At the same time, we have continued to publish helpful statistical data and to make it readily available through authorized government outlets.

SECRET